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Issues Raised by Restructuring 
of the Steel Industry in 
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1.1 The dimensions of restructuring 
 
In the 1990s Northeast Asia’s steel industry went through a remarkable 
restructuring process. The objective of this book is to investigate various 
aspects of this process, whereas the purpose of this introductory chap- 
ter is to outline the issues involved, how economists have attempted to 
address these issues, and how the following chapters contribute to these 
discussions. This section first introduces the issues by summarizing 
important dimensions of the restructuring process. Section 1.2 then 
identifies some of the major issues raised by the restructuring process 
and explains how economic principles can be used to analyze the issues 
at hand. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 outline the chapters in Parts II and III 
of this book, respectively, and how they contribute to the existing 
economic literature on the subjects examined in this volume. 
Perhaps the best indicator of restructuring in Northeast Asian steel 
was the large decline of employment in the region’s steel industry. 
Combined the region’s steel industry lost over 1 million jobs between 
the early 1990s and 2001, or a little over one quarter of the total in the 
early 1990s (Table 1.1). Job losses began early in Japan and Korea, where 
average steel employment fell 10 percent and 4 percent, respectively, 
between 1990–92 and 1993–96. Since these declines were more than off- 
set by growth in China and Taiwan (5 percent each), the regional total 
rose slightly. However, the declines then accelerated in Japan and Korea, 
to 26 percent and 14 percent, respectively, between 1993–96 and 2001. 
China’s attempts to reform the state-owned sector also led to an even 
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Table 1.1   Production and employment in Northeast Asian steel 
 
 
Indicator 1990–92 1993–96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
 
Employment of steel plants or firms in Northeast Asia (thousands) 
 
Northeast Asia 
Japan (plants, 4+) 
China (firms) 
3,720.05 3,844.67 na na na na 2,709.12 
335.97 302.79 273.84 261.02 242.62 236.53 223.82 
3,218.17 3,374.73 3,171.71 2,880.50 2,725.22 2,515.90 2,315.31 
Korea (plants, 5+) 77.96 74.95 70.68 64.87 67.31 64.82 64.35 
Taiwan (plants, 91, 96, 01) 87.96 92.21 na na na na 105.65 
Crude steel production (thousand metric tons) 
World 741,243 738,732 798,932 777,311 788,995 847,426 850,040 
Asia 244,071 274,745 308,633 297,873 308,799 331,845 353,799 
Northeast Asia 215,004 241,768 272,066 264,997 274,626 293,683 314,845 
Japan 106,040 99,590 104,545 93,548 94,192 106,444 102,866 
China 72,762 94,687 108,911 114,588 123,954 127,236 150,866 
Korea 25,727 35,612 42,554 39,896 41,042 43,107 43,852 
Taiwan 10,475 11,880 16,056 16,965 15,438 16,896 17,261 
Europe 333,038 279,540 291,483 281,810 283,991 308,891 304,694 
North America 106,710 119,102 129,462 129,940 130,069 135,137 119,657 
United States 84,445 92,691 98,485 98,658 97,427 101,803 90,104 
Other regions 301,495 340,090 377,987 365,561 374,935 403,398 425,689 
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Gross output or shipments of steel plants or firms in Northeast Asia (current US$ millions) 
Northeast Asia 192,229 229,364 na na na na 201,932 
Japan (plants, 4+) 131,818 136,098 120,364 98,864 99,394 110,679 92,174 
China (firms) 30,045 48,823 40,107 40,598 41,901 57,161 68,953 
Korea (plants, 5+) 18,346 26,314 27,564 21,137 24,609 29,245 25,737 
Taiwan (plants, 91, 96, 01) 12,019 18,129 na na na na 15,067 
Value added of steel plants or firms in Northeast Asia (current US$ millions) 
Northeast Asia 71,005 85,488 na na na na 70,495 
Japan (plants, 4+) 53,118 57,270 50,978 41,340 42,393 47,308 39,336 
China (firms) 7,633 14,597 10,688 10,932 11,414 15,692 18,487 
Korea (plants, 5+) 6,847 9,368 9,217 7,391 8,681 9,456 8,802 
Taiwan (firms, 91, 96, 01) 3,406 4,253 na na na na 3,871 
 
Notes: The figures for 1990–92 and 1993–96 are annual averages. North America includes Mexico. 
Sources: International Iron and Steel Institute (various years) and Tables 2.1, 3.2, 4.2, and 5.3. 
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larger rate of decline, 29 percent, in this latter period. Because China’s 
industry was by far the largest in terms of employment, China also 
accounted for the vast majority of the absolute number of jobs lost. In 
contrast, Taiwan’s steel employment continued to rise throughout the 
period. 
In the latter part of the decade, the current value of production 
(measured either as gross output, which includes the value of interme- 
diate consumption, or value added, which excludes intermediate con- 
sumption) also fell markedly in Japan, more moderately in Taiwan, and 
slightly in Korea (Table 1.1). These declines came after strong increases 
in Korea and Taiwan and mild increases in Japan early in the decade. In 
contrast, gross output and value added grew rapidly throughout the 
decade in China.1 The volume of crude steel production increased 
throughout the period studied in China, Korea, and Taiwan. It declined 
some in Japan early in the decade and increased even more slowly there- 
after. In other words, production values declined while production vol- 
ume increased in the period from 1993–96 to 2001 in Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan, suggesting that steel prices were falling during this period. 
The quantity and value data also suggest a very different ranking 
of the region’s steel industries. For example, the quantity data suggest 
that China surpassed Japan as the region’s largest steel producer by 
1997 but the value data suggest that the Japanese steel industry still 
produced approximately twice the amount of steel produced by the 
Chinese industry as late as 2000–01 (Table 1.1). The major reason for the 
difference in these rankings is the fact that China produces a large quan- 
tity of relatively low-quality, low-priced steel while Japan produces a 
much greater proportion of relatively high-quality, high-priced steel. 
Accordingly, this book is very careful to present information on both 
volume and values when available. 
Contrary to some common perceptions, Northeast Asia accounts for 
much larger shares of world steel production and consumption than of 
trade in steel. For example, measured in volume (tons), the four major 
Northeast Asian economies, Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan, combined 
to account for over one-third of the world’s production of crude steel 
and apparent consumption of either crude steel or finished steel prod- 
ucts in recent years (tons, Tables 1.1 and 1.2). In contrast, they 
accounted for only about one-fifth of the world’s steel exports and about 
one-sixth of world imports, measured in either quantity or value terms 
(Tables 1.3 and 1.4). 
Large differences in per capita consumption of  steel  among  the 
four Northeast Asian economies reflect different stages of economic 
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development for these economies (Table 1.2). For example, in value terms 
per capita consumption is by far the highest in Japan, followed by Taiwan, 
Korea, and very distantly by China, whose per capita consumption was 
only 9 percent of Japan’s level in 2001. In quantity terms China’s per 
capita consumption was 23 percent of Japan’s level in 2001, here again 
largely because China produces large quantities of relatively low-quality, 
low-priced steel. Per capita consumption in quantity terms is also higher 
in Korea and Taiwan than in Japan, probably for similar reasons. 
Large declines in Japan’s per capita consumption of steel between 
1990–92 and 2001 (Table 1.2), both in quantity (19 percent) and value 
terms (36 percent) resulted in part from declining demand for steel as 
an intermediate input and slow growth in several industries that con- 
sumed relatively large amounts of steel (e.g., steel itself, construction; 
see Chapter 2). In Korea and Taiwan, per capita consumption grew 
through 1996 or 1997, but fell off some in subsequent years and further 
declines seem likely in the future if these economies follow the Japanese 
pattern. By contrast, China’s per capita consumption of steel increased 
very rapidly, 165 percent in quantity terms and 114 percent in value 
terms, between 1990–92 and 2001. Although growth slowed markedly 
in 1997 and thereafter, especially in value terms, per capita consump- 
tion of steel is expected to continue growing as China continues to 
industrialize rapidly. 
Despite relatively low export propensities (ratios of exports to pro- 
duction) of 10–16 percent, Japan has remained the region’s largest steel 
exporter and revealed comparative advantage indices (RCAs) indicate it 
maintained a strong comparative advantage in the industry (Table 1.3).2 
RCAs also indicate Korea maintained a strong comparative advantage in 
steel and Korean exports were about one half of Japanese exports for 
most of the period. Korean export propensities were the region’s high- 
est, however, peaking at 36 percent immediately after the crisis in 1998, 
and fluctuating in the 20–26 percent range in other years. Although 
Taiwan’s exports were much smaller than Korea’s, its export propensities 
also increased markedly from 10–12 percent in 1991 and 1996 to 29 per- 
cent in 2001. Its RCAs also climbed over 1.0 from 1998 forward, indi- 
cating Taiwan had also developed a comparative advantage. By 
1998–2001 China’s exports were of similar magnitudes to Taiwan’s but 
its exports propensities and RCAs were low as China’s comparative dis- 
advantage in steel persisted. 
Steel imports have always been much smaller than exports in Japan, 
where they amounted to only 3–4 percent of apparent consumption 
(Table 1.4). Steel imports were also smaller than exports in all years in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2    Apparent consumption of steel by region or economy 
 
 
Indicator 1990–92 1993–96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
 
Apparent consumption of crude steel (thousand metric tons) 
World 734,524 727,033 789,493 783,645 800,306 870,348 880,901 
Asia 263,210 317,961 343,571 311,298 347,047 379,231 411,214 
Northeast Asia 211,349 254,543 270,557 253,125 281,713 309,141 332,295 
Japan 94,074 81,971 86,002 71,187 70,629 80,561 74,998 
China 75,156 115,370 119,660 131,700 151,150 163,240 196,350 
Korea 23,595 33,754 39,655 26,018 35,464 40,000 39,727 
Taiwan 18,523 23,448 25,240 24,220 24,470 25,340 21,220 
Europe 297,496 203,652 212,582 222,968 215,424 236,850 230,297 
North America 119,082 140,820 157,611 172,036 165,968 175,556 152,956 
United States 96,675 113,462 123,586 134,629 127,467 132,891 114,261 
Other regions 54,736 64,601 75,729 77,343 71,867 78,711 86,434 
Apparent consumption of finished steel (thousand metric tons) 
World 623,232 633,335 697,659 691,800 708,843 768,326 781,919 
Asia 228,652 280,685 305,171 279,224 309,993 338,223 367,941 
Northeast Asia 185,667 226,248 242,331 229,144 253,805 276,663 303,152 
Japan 88,323 75,629 79,881 70,300 68,900 76,100 73,200 
China 59,798 99,074 103,508 113,934 130,754 141,210 174,180 
Korea 22,109 32,008 37,912 24,720 33,761 38,333 38,092 
Taiwan 15,437 19,538 21,030 20,190 20,390 21,020 17,680 
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Europe 246,982 175,744 187,003 196,689 190,082 208,904 203,153 
North America 101,633 121,401 141,241 150,051 147,371 154,227 136,664 
United States 83,322 100,207 113,358 119,816 116,393 120,012 106,164 
Other regions 45,965 55,506 64,244 65,836 61,397 66,972 74,161 
Apparent consumption of steel (US$ millions) 
Northeast Asia 186,173 225,690 na na na na 192,429 
Japan 122,549 124,747 108,156 86,352 88,217 98,596 80,112 
China 32,140 55,600 43,234 44,098 47,243 62,543 75,645 
Korea 17,282 25,973 26,963 16,123 22,108 27,188 23,468 
Taiwan (91, 96, 01) 14,202 19,371 na na na na 13,204 
Apparent consumption per capita (kilograms finished steel) 
Japan 713 603 634 556 544 600 576 
China 51 81 83 91 103 111 136 
Korea 510 712 825 534 724 816 805 
Taiwan 749 919 967 921 924 952 792 
Apparent consumption of steel per capita (US$) 
Japan 988 995 857 683 696 777 629 
China 28 46 35 35 38 49 59 
Korea 399 578 587 348 474 578 496 
Taiwan (91, 96, 01) 691 902 na na na na 591 
 
Notes: The figures for 1990–92 and 1993–96 are annual averages. North America includes Mexico. 
Sources: International Iron and Steel Institute (various years); Statistics Canada (2003). 
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Table 1.3   Exports and indices of revealed comparative advantage in steel by region or economy 
 
 
Indicator 1990–92 1993–96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
 
Exports of finished and semi-finished products (thousand metric tons) 
 
World 181,412 236,031 267,819 269,541 280,796 306,419 301,193 
Asia 35,404 45,840 55,250 64,069 63,680 73,105 70,194 
Northeast Asia 31,982 40,830 48,192 54,924 53,412 61,807 58,991 
Japan 17,704 21,826 22,892 24,996 26,085 28,478 29,494 
China 3,675 5,464 8,907 5,863 5,975 11,159 7,487 
Korea 8,785 10,429 11,292 18,383 13,691 13848 14,035 
Taiwan 1,818 3,111 5,101 5,682 7,661 8,322 7,975 
Europe 113,519 153,408 173,031 167,679 177,643 192,620 193,129 
North America 10,869 13,979 16,739 16,260 15,925 17,166 15,188 
United States 4,660 4,677 5,568 5,110 5,029 6,011 5,671 
Other regions 21,619 22,805 22,799 21,533 23,548 23,528 22,682 
Exports (current US$ millions) 
World 
 
109,362 
 
139,873 
 
155,487 
 
153,551 
 
136,248 
 
154,487 
 
143,122 
Asia 24,741 34,437 40,061 39,119 36,098 42,646 38,968 
Northeast Asia 20,522 26,465 30,871 30,685 27,965 33,552 29,934 
Japan 13,608 15,838 16,446 15,493 14,227 15,820 14,902 
China 1,514 3,200 5,137 4,004 3,398 5,316 4,147 
Korea 4,238 5,259 5,995 7,557 6,329 7,207 6,459 
Taiwan 1,162 2,168 3,294 3,630 4,011 5,209 4,426 
Europe 65,799 75,185 78,399 80,277 68,543 73,669 70,924 
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North America 7,650 10,201 13,339 12,835 11,228 12,760 11,423 
United States 4,468 5,348 7,136 6,953 6,302 7,326 6,881 
Other regions 11,171 20,051 23,688 21,322 20,379 25,412 21,806 
Revealed comparative advantage indices 
 
Asia 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.88 
Northeast Asia 1.23 1.18 1.27 1.30 1.29 1.28 1.29 
Japan 1.40 1.33 1.40 1.41 1.40 1.35 1.54 
China 0.67 0.78 1.00 0.76 0.70 0.85 0.63 
Korea 1.94 1.69 1.59 1.96 1.82 1.71 1.80 
Taiwan 0.47 0.64 0.91 1.04 1.26 1.33 1.32 
Europe 1.27 1.21 1.19 1.17 1.17 1.21 1.21 
North America 0.53 0.52 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
United States 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.40 
Other regions 0.84 1.14 1.18 1.15 1.21 1.23 1.14 
Export–output ratios in Northeast Asia (percent) 
Northeast Asia 11 12 na na na na 15 
Japan (plants, 4+) 10 12 14 16 14 14 16 
China (firms) 5 7 13 10 8 9 6 
Korea (plants, 5+) 23 20 22 36 26 25 25 
Taiwan (plants, 91, 96, 01) 10 12 na na na na 29 
 
Notes: The figures for 1990–92 and 1993–96 are annual averages. North America includes Mexico. 
Sources: International Iron and Steel Institute (various years); Statistics Canada (2003); Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.4    Imports of steel by region or economy 
 
 
Indicator 1990–92 1993–96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 
 
Imports of finished and semi-finished products (thousand metric tons) 
 
World 171,811 228,620 249,439 255,528 264,993 298,498 292,000 
Asia 48,729 85,983 78,957 59,004 76,874 85,327 85,453 
Northeast Asia 27,952 51,571 41,736 32,694 43,801 50,256 48,788 
Japan 7,455 6,196 6,414 4,862 4,737 5,089 4,086 
China 5,321 23,506 13,619 13,106 16,998 20,710 25,636 
Korea 6,785 8,917 9,438 3,614 8,878 11,449 10,737 
Taiwan 8,392 12,953 12,265 11,112 13,188 13,008 8,329 
Europe 83,436 90,611 108,247 119,830 120,823 134,356 130,891 
North America 20,908 31,159 37,979 49,595 43,146 50,907 41,463 
United States 15,354 23,628 28,471 37,948 32,735 34,754 27,793 
Other regions 18,738 20,867 24,256 27,099 24,150 27,908 34,193 
Imports (current US$ millions) 
World 
 
109,362 
 
139,873 
 
155,487 
 
153,551 
 
136,248 
 
154,487
 
143,122 
Asia 31,520 48,146 50,222 37,783 39,252 45,958 41,669 
Northeast Asia 14,225 23,637 21,852 16,327 19,123 23,579 20,431 
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Japan 4,339 4,487 4,239 2,981 3,049 3,737 2,840 
China 3,608 9,978 8,264 7,505 8,740 10,699 10,839 
Korea 3,174 4,917 5,394 2,543 3,828 5,150 4,190 
Taiwan 3,104 4,255 3,955 3,297 3,506 3,993 2,562 
Europe 53,737 60,350 65,183 71,964 62,130 67,805 64,941 
North America 14,618 20,215 25,119 28,567 23,676 28,319 23,128 
United States 10,685 14,963 17,650 20,563 16,315 19,185 15,176 
Other regions 9,487 11,161 14,963 15,237 11,191 12,405 13,384 
Import/apparent  consumption 
ratios (percent) 
Northeast Asia 
 
 
8 
 
 
10 
 
 
na 
 
 
na 
 
 
na 
 
 
na 
 
 
11 
Japan (plants, 4+) 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 
China (firms) 11 18 19 17 18 17 14 
Korea (plants, 5+) 18 19 20 16 17 19 18 
Taiwan (plants, 91, 96, 01) 22 22 na na na na 19 
 
Notes: The figures for 1990–92 and 1993–96 are annual averages. North America includes Mexico. 
Sources: International Iron and Steel Institute (various years); Statistics Canada (2003); International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development 
(2003); Table 1.2. 
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Korea, but shares of apparent consumption were much larger, 18–20 per- 
cent in all years except the period after the financial crisis. In Taiwan 
imports were larger than exports through 1997, but exports became 
larger thereafter and import shares of apparent consumption fell 
from 22 percent in 1991 and 1996 to 19 percent in 2001. In China, 
imports grew very rapidly between 1990–92 and 1993–96, when import 
shares of apparent consumption increased from 11 percent to 18 per- 
cent. Imports stagnated thereafter and the import share of apparent 
consumption fell back to 14 percent by 2001. 
The above discussion highlights how domestic markets dominate the 
steel industry in Northeast Asia, absorbing the vast majority of steel pro- 
duction in all of the region’s economies. Moreover, Asian trade in steel 
tends to be highly concentrated within the region. By 1998–2001, about 
two-thirds of Asian steel imports came from other Asian economies 
(Table 1.5). The vast majority of Asian steel imports were from Northeast 
Asia. The intraregional share of imports was smaller in Asia than in 
Europe, where 85–92 percent of steel imports came from within Europe, 
but higher than in North America, where only about one-third of steel 
imports were intraregional during 1990–2001. In the North American 
market Europe and Asia each accounted for about one-fourth of the steel 
imports. 
Although many of the region’s large steel firms are multinational 
firms with operations in many countries, foreign operations are less 
prevalent in steel than in many other manufacturing industries. For 
example, in Japan multinational parents employed 93,258 workers or 
about two-fifths of Japanese total in 2001, but the ratio of employment 
in foreign affiliates to employment in Japanese parents was only 0.52, 
compared to 1.13 for all manufacturing industries combined (Ministry 
of Economy, Trade, and Industry, 2004). 
 
1.2 Issues raised by restructuring and 
related economic principles 
 
The vast restructuring in Northeast Asia’s steel industry raises several 
important issues, which are in turn related to various portions of the 
economic literature. These include issues related to (1) steel’s changing 
role as key industrial and military input and corresponding changes in 
the role of the state in the Northeast Asia’s steel industry; (2) macro- 
economic influences on industry performance, in particular the 
Japanese slowdown after 1992 and Asian financial crisis and its aftermath 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.5   Shares of steel imports in major regions by source (% of regional imports, except where noted) 
 
Importer, source 1985–89 1990–92 1993–96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
World Imports (US$ millions) 85,885 109,362 139,873 155,487 153,551 136,248 154,487 143,122 
Asia 25 23 25 26 25 26 28 27 
Northeast Asia 21 19 19 20 20 21 22 21 
Japan 17 12 11 11 10 10 10 10 
China 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 3 
Korea 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
Taiwan 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Europe 60 60 54 50 52 50 48 50 
North America (including Mexico) 6 7 7 9 8 8 8 8 
United States 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
Other regions 10 10 14 15 14 15 16 15 
Asia’s Imports (US$ millions) 23,697 31,520 48,146 50,222 37,783 39,252 45,958 41,669 
Asia 57 57 57 62 66 65 65 67 
Northeast Asia 49 46 43 48 51 52 54 53 
Japan 38 30 25 25 25 27 27 27 
China 2 4 5 8 7 6 8 6 
Korea 8 10 9 10 12 11 11 11 
Taiwan 2 3 4 6 7 8 8 9 
Europe 25 22 20 17 17 13 12 14 
North America 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 
United States 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Other regions 15 16 20 19 15 20 20 17 
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Table 1.5   Continued  
Importer, source 1985–89 1990–92 1993–96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Europe’s Imports (US$ millions) 38,227 53,737 60,350 65,183 71,964 62,130 67,805 64,941 
Asia 2 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 
Northeast Asia 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
China 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Korea 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Europe 91 92 91 90 88 88 85 86 
North America 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other regions 5 4 5 5 6 6 8 8 
North America’s Imports 
(US$ millions) 
Asia 
13,335 
 
31
14,618 
 
26
20,215 
 
18 
25,119 
 
18 
28,567 
 
27 
23,676 
 
24 
28,319 
 
24 
23,128 
 
23 
Northeast Asia 28 24 16 15 24 19 19 19 
Japan 22 17 10 9 14 9 8 9 
China 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 
Korea 5 5 3 3 6 5 5 5 
Taiwan 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 
Europe 34 30 31 25 22 22 23 23 
North America 23 33 33 37 32 36 34 37 
United States 7 16 14 17 15 18 18 20 
Other regions 12 12 17 20 19 18 18 17 
 
Notes: The figures for 1985–89, 1990–92, and 1993–96 are annual averages. North America includes Mexico. 
Source: Statistics Canada (2003). 
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in the late 1990s; (3) trade and protectionism; and (4) industrial organ- 
ization and scale economies. All of the following chapters analyze one 
or more of these issues and the purpose of this section is to provide an 
overview of them. 
The steel industry has traditionally been one of the most promoted 
and protected industries in Northeast Asia and elsewhere. Steel has long 
been a key industrial and military input, giving it some characteristics 
similar to those of other public goods such as police or fire services and 
communication or transportation infrastructure. Correspondingly, 
national governments have strongly promoted the industry by various 
means. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s in Japan and during 
the 1970s in Korea and to a lesser extent in Taiwan, respective govern- 
ments used a variety of policy instruments, ranging from import pro- 
tection to preferential supply of low-interest government loans, export 
promotion, and tax breaks and special tax measures, such as accelerated 
depreciation and investment tax credits.3 
Japan was able to overcome its high dependence on imported iron ore 
and coal through development of modern harbors capable of servicing 
new large-scale bulk carriers of these raw materials from overseas. By 
constructing large greenfield steel mills adjacent to the harbors, Japan 
accomplished two objectives: expanded production of steel as an impor- 
tant domestic industrial input and efficient export capabilities in steel, 
taking advantage of economies of scale and reductions in transportation 
costs. Japan’s steel producers were encouraged to expand capacity and 
modernize with the government providing infrastructure and various 
incentive measures mentioned above (Yamawaki, 1988). 
In the early 1970s the Japanese government engineered the merger 
that formed the largest steel maker in the world at that time, Nippon 
Steel. In Korea private conglomerates or chaebol were encouraged to 
enter the industry and expand capacity in the heavy industrialization 
drive that began in 1973. Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) was 
established during this period as a state enterprise with access to credit 
on favorable terms. In Taiwan the government owned and operated the 
largest firm there, China Steel, which began production in 1974 (Wade, 
1990). In China the government continues to own and operate all its 
large steel firms. 
However, the 1990s was a watershed decade for Northeast Asia’s steel 
industry partially because governments greatly reduced their support for 
the steel industry in Korea and China, and all governments increasingly 
emphasized market-based  solutions  to  problems in the industry. In 
Japan, this process had begun decades earlier in the 1970s. In Taiwan, 
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the government continued to own a large stake in China Steel, but this 
company was much smaller than the large steel firms in other countries 
and smaller companies accounted for a much larger portion of the steel 
industry in Taiwan than in Japan, Korea, or China. 
One reason that governments increasingly emphasized market-based 
arrangements in the industry was because of large macroeconomic diffi- 
culties encountered in Japan from the early part of the decade and then 
in Korea in the latter part. Although the Japanese slowdown was not 
sharp, it was prolonged, which played a major role for the large down- 
sizing in the country’s steel industry. In Korea, there was a very sharp 
contraction following the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, which greatly 
reduced domestic demand for steel and contributed to a large spike in 
Korean exports in 1998. The Japanese and Korean slowdowns also left 
governments far less able to provide large financial support to steel 
industries there. In China robust economic growth kept demand for steel 
growing rapidly throughout the period and growth was also steadier in 
Taiwan because it too was able to avoid a severe downturn in this period. 
Protection from import competition was an important element of gov- 
ernment  intervention  in  Japan  until  the  early  1970s,  and  in  Korea, 
China, and Taiwan until the early 1990s. The literature that links trade 
theory with industrial organization shows that trade policy may raise 
domestic welfare if oligopolistic profits can be shifted from foreign firms 
to domestic firms. In the strategic trade policy literature, it is assumed 
that the government is able to set its policy and alter the perceived cost 
structure of firms in advance of the firms’ production decisions. Brander 
and Spencer (1985) illustrate that export subsidies improve the relative 
position of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign 
firms, and allow the domestic firm to expand its market share. Krugman 
(1984) shows that when marginal cost declines with output or when 
there are dynamic economies of learning-by-doing, protecting domestic 
firm increases the domestic firm’s market share in both the domestic and 
export markets. While policy makers in Northeast Asian countries prob- 
ably protected the steel industry in the earlier period based upon the 
infant-industry argument,4 rather than upon the argument for the strate- 
gic government policies suggested by Brander and Spencer (1985) and 
Krugman (1984), they conceived steel as a strategic sector as indicated 
above. Thus, they maintained a relatively high degree of protection until 
the domestic firms became competitive in the world market. 
US protectionism in its steel industries has also attracted a lot of atten- 
tion in Northeast Asia. Indeed,  interest  in  the  effects  of  renewed 
US  protectionism  in  the  late  1990s  was  one  of  the  motivations  to 
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organize the project that has eventually led to this book. However, 
Northeast Asia’s protection of its own steel industries has declined in 
recent years as the region increased emphasis on market-based solu- 
tions. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was also 
very significant in this respect. In addition, the United States has been 
a small market for Northeast Asia’s steel industries, which made US pro- 
tectionism a relatively minor concern in and of itself. A larger concern 
is that China has apparently begun to imitate the US attempt to limit 
imports through anti-dumping actions and other measures and other 
countries in Asia might follow. 
Restructuring in Northeast Asian steel resulted in a marked consoli- 
dation of the region’s industry with some important mergers and the 
proliferation of strategic alliances. In Japan and Korea, the steel indus- 
try has always been best characterized as an oligopoly, in which a rela- 
tively few large firms have a potentially large degree of power over price 
and output in the industry. Recent restructuring has probably strength- 
ened the market power of the largest firms. The degree of concentration 
also appears to be increasing in China with mergers among some of its 
largest steel makers. Only Taiwan has what might be characterized as a 
monopolistically competitive industry in which firms exercise relatively 
little market power.5 One of the most important reasons steel tends to 
be an oligopoly is technical, the existence of substantial plant-level scale 
economies in many product lines. Accordingly, it is technically impos- 
sible to turn steel into a competitive industry when these product lines 
occupy a large portion of production. One question that arises is then 
do the region’s authorities think it is necessary to regulate the large steel 
firms in order to prevent them from abusing their apparently growing 
market power? If so what form should this regulation take? 
 
1.3 Northeast Asia’s steel production, 
employment, and trade 
 
The four chapters in Part II of this book summarize major trends in 
production, employment, trade, and related indicators and examine the 
factors that affected the performance of the steel industry in Japan, 
China, Korea, and Taiwan. In Chapter 2, Oleksandr Movshuk, Eric D. 
Ramstetter, and Hiro Lee investigate the causes that led to a sharp con- 
traction of Japan’s steel industry in the 1990s. By the 1980s, the growth 
rate of value added slowed down considerably while employment con- 
tracted markedly. During the 1990s both value added and employment 
declined. Although part of the decline can be attributed to declining 
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steel prices in the 1990s, the sharp fall in employment indicates the 
large scope of restructuring in Japan’s steel industry. Movshuk, 
Ramstetter, and Lee decompose the growth of sales in several dimen- 
sions, first showing that declines in intermediate material costs and the 
operating surplus or profits accounted for the large portions of falling 
steel production in most years, but that falling labor costs have become 
more important in recent years. Second, declines in domestic demand 
components, both price and quantity, accounted for much larger pro- 
portions of the decline in steel production than do declines in exports. 
Third, declines in domestic sales of hot-rolled steel, cold-rolled steel, and 
crude steel, as well as declines in production of blast furnace products, 
rolled products, and steel materials were also relatively large compared 
to declines in other product categories. The authors suggest that the 
prolonged slowdown of the Japanese economy from 1992, reduced use 
of steel as an intermediate input, and to a lesser extent, the collapse of 
Asian demand after the financial crisis of 1997–98 were some of the 
major factors causing the significant fall in production and employment 
of Japan’s steel industry in the 1990s. 
Despite the extremely rapid growth in steel consumption and pro- 
duction volume in China since the early 1990s, China lags behind the 
other three Northeastern economies in technology. In Chapter 3, 
Oleksandr Movshuk takes a close look at recent trends in production 
capacity, product mix, technological modernization, and trade propen- 
sity of China’s steel industry. He observes that excess supply of steel 
products with low value-added content (e.g., rails, bars, rods, tubes, and 
pipes) and excess demand for products with high value-added content 
(e.g., hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel, galvanized sheet, and stainless 
steel) have persisted in the domestic market. In other words, China has 
been a net exporter of relatively low-quality steel and a net importer of 
relatively high-quality steel. China’s comparative advantage in low- 
quality steel reflects its relatively low technological level of steel pro- 
duction. Movshuk then discusses major reform initiatives to modernize 
the industry, including the conversion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
into corporate entities and recent efforts to create internationally com- 
petitive steel conglomerates around the four largest steel producers in 
China (Anshan, Baoshan Shougang, and Wuhan). To evaluate the impact 
of these recent reform initiatives on enterprise efficiency, the author 
reviews major studies that examine the efficiency of Chinese steel mak- 
ers, and discusses their policy implications for reforming this chroni- 
cally underperforming sector. Despite noteworthy progress in upgrading 
the  technological  facilities,  he  concludes  that  recent  restructuring 
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initiatives have not resulted in a significant improvement in techno- 
logical efficiency. 
Korea was sharply affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, 
which caused large reductions in its domestic demand and production. 
After the crisis, a number of Korean firms, including a few medium-sized 
steel firms, became insolvent and had to cease operations, while other 
firms suspended or cancelled planned investments. Tae Yol Lee exam- 
ines the vulnerability of Korean steel makers with the overcapacity prob- 
lem after the crisis and how they restructured their operations in 
Chapter 4. Lee observes excess capacity supply in rolling facilities com- 
pared to its crude steel capacity, which led Korea to become a net 
importer of crude steel and a net exporter of finished steel. In addition, 
he analyzes the role of international trade in Korean steel, highlighting 
the important role the large increase of exports played in 1998 as a 
buffer for Korean steel makers in the midst of the crisis. Finally, Lee uses 
a simple model of interactions between domestic steel demand and 
macroeconomic variables to illustrate how exchange rate adjustments 
played an important role in the recovery of Korea’s steel industry after 
the crisis. 
While Taiwan’s steel output and exports remained relatively small 
until the mid-1980s, it emerged as an efficient steel exporter in the late 
1990s. In Chapter 5, Hung-Hua Tien first examines major stages in the 
historical development of Taiwanese steel industry, with a particular 
focus on changing production capacity, technological development, 
and involvement in international trade. She then employs data envel- 
opment analysis (DEA) to estimate the relative performance of eight 
major Taiwanese steel firms and finds that the pure technical efficiency 
had less importance as a source of inefficiency compared with the scale 
of production. The results suggest that the development of a more effi- 
cient and competitive steel-making sector should be encouraged in 
Taiwan and that there should be more emphasis on improving scale 
efficiency, rather than pure technical efficiency. 
 
1.4 Trade policy issues, restructuring, 
and strategic alliances 
 
Steel has been a source of trade friction between the United States and 
Northeast Asian countries since the late 1960s when Japanese exports to 
the US market increased drastically. Steel exports to the United States 
have been under some forms of restriction in the past three and a half 
decades. For example, the Japanese government agreed to voluntarily 
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restrict its steel exports to the United States in 1969. The quantitative 
restrictions were initially imposed for three years, but in 1972 the vol- 
untary restraint agreements (VRAs) were extended for three additional 
years. After VRAs were lifted in 1975, the US steel imports increased 
sharply and the steel lobby launched a political drive to fight the import 
surge, accusing foreign steel makers of dumping. In 1978, the US gov- 
ernment introduced the trigger price mechanism (TPM) to set minimum 
prices for steel in the US market. Imported steel entering the United States 
below the minimum price was subject to formal anti-dumping investiga- 
tions by the US Department of Commerce and the US International 
Trade Commission. Although the TPM was suspended in 1982, Northeast 
Asian steel makers continued to face US protectionist measures and 
actions in the past two decades, including the reinstitution of VRA from 
1984–92, a large number of anti-dumping petitions filed by US steel 
makers after the Asian financial crisis that eventually led to punitive anti- 
dumping duties in many cases, and the imposition of safeguard measures 
in  2002–03. 
The effects and implications of protectionist trade measures for the 
US steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s have been investigated by a 
number of studies (e.g., Canto, 1984; Crandall, 1981, 1987; Lenway and 
Schuler, 1991). These studies suggest that some of the policies that lim- 
ited US steel imports in the 1970s and 1980s had a significant effect on 
reducing steel imports, at least in the short run.6 However, they also 
suggest that trade protection  in  the  earlier  decades  did  not  induce 
US steel makers to become more internationally competitive. Two of the 
three chapters in Part III assess the implications of US steel protection 
and the related issues in the post-Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. In 
Chapter 6, William E. James and Craig Parsons posture that large fluc- 
tuations in US trading partners’ export prices of steel have resulted from 
extreme exchange rate changes, as well as from excessive capacity result- 
ing from depressed demand conditions. In particular, the authors exam- 
ine the competitive firm behavior as an alternative explanation of 
dumping and consider the possibility of collusive behavior of steel firms 
under the anti-dumping actions. James and Parsons consider the possi- 
ble avenues East Asia may explore for resolving the trade dispute and 
the economic costs associated with US steel protection. 
In Chapter 7, Hiro Lee and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe assess 
the effects of US safeguard measures that were imposed in March 2002 
and terminated in December 2003, after the WTO’s Appellate Body 
report of November 2003 upheld the complainants’ arguments that the 
US steel safeguards were in violation of WTO rules.7 The authors employ 
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a dynamic multi-country computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
to estimate the impact of the temporary safeguards on economic wel- 
fare, real GDP, trade flows, and sectoral output and average cost of steel 
and the related industries. Not surprisingly, the effects on Northeast 
Asian countries are extremely small because their exports to the United 
States constitute small percentages of their total steel exports. Although 
US  economic  welfare  increases  slightly  in  2002–03  because  of  an 
improvement in its terms of trade, its real GDP declines by small per- 
centages because an increase in output of the steel industry is more 
than offset by reductions in output of other industries, particularly 
those that use steel intensively as an intermediate input. The effects on 
output of the steel-consuming industries in Northeast Asian countries 
are positive, but they are extremely small. Canada and Mexico, which 
were exempted from the safeguard measures, would benefit the most 
because of a sharp increase in their exports to the United States. Lee and 
van der Mensbrugghe also compare the outcomes between (1) the per- 
fect competition and constant returns to scale and (2) imperfect com- 
petition and increasing returns to scale, and find that the magnitudes of 
the effects of the US policy are significantly greater under the second case. 
The last chapter of this book examines recent restructuring as well as 
mergers and strategic alliances among Northeast Asia’s large steel mak- 
ers. Many large steel firms aggressively restructured their operations in 
the  last  decade.  This  restructuring  was  particularly  far-reaching  in 
China, Japan, and Korea, with some firms liquidating, others merging, 
and  strategic  alliances  being  strengthened.  Partially  because  of  this 
restructuring, employment in most large steel firms began to fall rapidly 
after the early 1990s. The Asian financial crisis also had an especially 
large impact on Korean firms as domestic demand contracted sharply in 
1997  and  1998.  Commensurate  with  decreased  Asian  demand  and 
strong US growth, exports to the United States surged in the late 1990s, 
and  the  United  States  then  charged  numerous  steel  producers  in 
Northeast Asia and elsewhere with dumping. This firm-level analysis 
reveals few differences in firm performance between the late 1990s and 
previous years that would substantiate such charges. Northeast Asian 
steel makers also sold most of their output in domestic markets and the 
vast majority of exports went to other Asian countries, not to North 
America or Europe, suggesting that the dumping issue was not quanti- 
tatively important to these firms. On the other hand, the tendency of 
governments to promote greater reliance on market-based solutions in 
an industry that once received highly preferential treatment has been of 
much more consequence. The proliferation of mergers and strategic 
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alliances among the region’s largest steel makers also raises potentially 
important antitrust questions. 
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Notes 
 
1. In Japan, gross output and value added both fell slightly less than one-third 
between 1993–96 and 2001, following increases of 3 percent and 8 percent 
respectively, between 1990–92  and  1993–96.  In  Taiwan,  gross  output  fell 
17 percent and value added declined 9 percent following increases of 46 percent 
and  25  percent,  respectively.  In  Korea,  the  declines  were  6  percent  and 
2 percent, respectively, following increases of 43 percent and 37 percent, 
respectively. In China gross output and value added increased by 62 percent 
and 91 percent,  respectively,  in  the  early  period  and  by  41  percent  and 
27 percent in the latter. 
2. RCAs are calculated as the ratio of (1) the share of steel exports in total 
exports for a country to (2) the share of worldwide steel exports in total 
worldwide exports. In a world where trade flows are determined solely by 
comparative advantage (comparative costs), RCAs exceeding 1.0 indicates a 
comparative advantage in the commodity category in question and RCAs less 
than 1.0 indicates a comparative disadvantage. In reality, however, compara- 
tive prices determine comparative advantage and RCAs are thus influenced 
by factors related to the price–cost margin (e.g., tariffs and other import pro- 
tection as well as imperfect competition), in addition to comparative costs. 
When RCAs are consistently higher or lower than 1.0, however, it is likely that 
comparative prices and comparative costs are strongly correlated. 
3. Lee (1993) finds that the steel and transport equipment industries benefited 
the most from Japan’s industrial policy during the 1960s. 
4. According to the infant-industry argument, a nation may have a potential 
comparative advantage in a product, but because of lack of know-how and the 
initial small output level, the industry cannot compete with more established 
foreign firms. Temporary protection is then justified to establish the domestic 
industry during its “infancy” until it can meet foreign competition, achieve 
economies of scale, and reflect the nation’s long-run comparative advantage. 
5. However, Wade (1990, p. 100) suggests that China Steel had a virtual monop- 
oly in the domestic market. Although mini-mills producing specialty steel of 
high quality have had a presence in Taiwan, they were reliant on basic steel 
input from China Steel. 
6. For example, Crandall (1981, p. 114) estimated that the trigger price mecha- 
nism would have resulted in a reduction in the US import share of steel from 
18 percent to 13 percent. 
7. The complainants were the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, China, 
Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and Brazil. 
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